To begin with, we must acknowledge the fact that Iranian society is more divided than many in the media believe and furthermore, the Iranian polity is more divided (and thus diverse) than most (if not all) Iranians are willing to acknowledge publicly or privately.
This is an important acknowledgement in that it explains the intransigent way that parties in the current political crisis are behaving. Each side believes that "the people" are behind them and they are each correct in identifying a mass following but each side believes that the divisions in Iranian society are 90% to 10% in their favor.
They are all wrong. This much should be clear by now.
Many of the more excitable elements of the media (and, to be sure, of the Iranian people themselves) see the current constitutional crisis as being reminiscent of the revolution of 1978-79. They point to the large crowds that showed up to protest the announced results of the June election without noticing who these people are and who they are not.
The media loves narratives, they need narratives, and they seem to only recognize familiar paradigms.
Hence, this is a stuggle of "people vs. government" or "students vs. security forces" or "youth vs. the establishment" or even "secular vs. religious."
Of course, what is unstated is that it is also a matter of urban and provincial liberal elites vs. a coalition of rural and urban conservatives. It is a conflict where the optimates of Iranian society are filling the streets against the populares, which is to say, it is a conflict of rich vs. poor and we are in the unfamiliar narrative space of watching a society where the government monopoly of violence is being brought to bear against the well-to-do elements of society who desire social and political liberties and freedoms as well as more economic advancement. The government security forces would be unable (and perhaps unwilling) to do this if it wasn't for the existence of a vested interest on the part of a large sector of society (perhaps as many as 40-50%) who are either very conservative, poor, vested in the continuance of the status quo or any combination of those elements.
Which is to say, for every crowd that forms for one side, there is another crowd that forms for the other. And the right wing (as in most places) doesn't play nice and they don't roll over and they tend to carry sticks and lead pipes. This may not be entirely fair of them, but politics are never fair.
Neither side of this argument has a monopoly on being right. All sides have a genuine right, and all sides have been genuinely wrong at some point in this argument.
Mr. Ahmadinejad's policies are often short-sighted, even when popular.
"Death to potatoes!" is a funny slogan unless you're a potato farmer with a bumper crop on your hands that is about to rot and become a millstone around your neck if someone doesn't step in and find something to do with them before prices collapse so far that they become worthless.
"Death to potatoes!" is hilarious unless you're an out of work disabled veteran with a family that's going a little bit more hungry every day and might take kindly to anyone who shows up with a sack of potatoes.
So far, many Iranians have declined to chant "Death to Addidas!" or "Death to state-subsidized higher education!" They have declined to do so for the same reason that many have taken to their rooftops and into the streets to protest an obviously rigged election. Each side in this conflict still believes that they represent all of Iran and that their opponents are a misled minority.
They are all wrong.
The protesters are not the voice of the whole people.
The counter-protesters are not the voice of the whole people.
Student leaders are no more the "voice of the people" than basij volunteers. Each side represents sizable popular support. Neither group is a majority.
They are all Iran. So far, they all believe they are part of the same Iran. But for a long time now each of the extremes of this Iran have been living in different countries.
There is a certain popular lie in North Tehran. (It is a lie. There is no other word for it. Rumor is not a sufficient word for it.) The lie is that the security forces have imported Palestinian youths and armed them to use as security forces. This is a telling story. Because Iran's idle rich class refuses to believe other Iranians would resent them enough to beat them in the streets with sticks for wearing too much makeup or dressing like Eurotrash.
To the folks in Division 1 Tehran, the other Iranians might as well be from Palestine.
Similarly, on the other side of the coin are Iranians who simply cannot believe that anyone would take to the streets to protest anything without CIA or BBC money in their pockets.
They're all wrong. Iran has been living a double life for so long that the two Irans don't even recognize each other anymore.
The real problem lies in the fact that most of these Iranians believe that the other Iranians are not worthy of their attention, and in many cases they don't believe the other Iranians have a right to exist. Conservative Iranians at least understand that the idle rich class are human beings even if they are "a bunch of sluts, whores, pimps, drunks and nancy-boys." (A vivid translation, but accurate.) To listen to many of the "enlightened" class of "liberal" Iranians they live in a sea of subhumans. To them the word "worker" is the same as "menial" the word "laborer" is the same as "worthless."
Is it any wonder that many of the "menials" and "worthless" eaters of potatoes don't give a rat's ass if the election was rigged? Is it any wonder that some people are willing to pick up lead pipes and beat up rich kids in the streets?
So, we are left to wonder if these two Irans can be reconciled by cooler heads or if they will descend into open war with each other. For now, the political disagreements have revealed a broader base of disagreement among the leadership of the Islamic Republic. This is healthy.
The protests and the counterattacks have revealed at long last an unhealthy division of Iranian society. This diversity of opinion is not dangerous as long as the various sides recognize each other's existence and acknowledge the need for compromise. It seems that the leadership has always known this. But from their rhetoric it seems that the people on either side have yet to understand the need for compromise.
Each side believes that they speak for "the people." It has not occurred to either side that there is no "people" just people, sometimes very divided, who have to be reconciled in some manner if the country is to avoid chaos and civil war.
The rich and the liberal and the educated and the urban and the secular don't believe in the possibility of a civil war because they don't believe the other Iran exists, or that if it does exist it has no right to have as much of a say as the rich and the liberal and the educated and the urban and the secular. They believe the conservative and the religious and the rural and the poor will roll over and surrender to their moral authority and their inherent rights. (Or perhaps they believe they will get some outside help?)
The conservative and the religious and the rural and the poor, meanwhile don't care if this leads to civil war. They don't care, because they think they can win a fight in the streets against the "sluts and the whores and the pimps and the nancy-boys" and the students and the rich folk and the liberals and the communists and even the CIA and the MKO and anyone else who might show up looking for a fight. They are probably right.
My hope is that we never have to find out.
It is not just the idea of an Islamic Republic that depends on a compromise being found, but the very idea of Iran itself that lies in the balance.
